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I. INTRODUCTION
The release from confinement of persons acquitted by reason of
insanity is one of the most perplexing problems of the criminal
law. The insanity acquittee's release confronts our deepest fears,
and the procedures which society employes in this process force us
to face the difficult and often intractable issue of the responsibility
of the criminally insane.
Virginia courts have required vocational training of an insanity
acquittee prior to the release of the not guilty by reason of insanity
(NGRI) patient from hospitalization.' While the Code of Virginia
provides procedures for the committing court to retain its common
law power to conditionally release the NGRI patient, in our experi-
ence, this procedure has rarely been employed as a vehicle to man-
date vocational training. Typically, vocational training is required
by the court while the patient retains criminal commitment status.
As the patient is not being conditionally released under the current
Virginia practice, the requirement of vocational training can be
viewed only as a precondition of release.
As a precondition of release, vocational training can be justified
only if it bears a sufficient relation to the statutory standards for
release of a criminal committee. If the need for vocational training
can be shown to bear a relation to either the patient's insanity or
dangerousness, vocational training may legitimately be imposed as
a precondition of release. A number of factors support our view
that in the typical case vocational training will not be related to
either of these criteria for release. Accepting, however, the proposi-
tion that if such proof is adduced vocational training may legiti-
mately be imposed as a precondition of release, our research and
experience have unveiled no instance in which such proof was un-
dertaken. We believe that current Virginia practice of precondi-
tioning the NGRI's release on the patient's participation in voca-
tional training is therefore invalid under the statutory scheme. In
our view, vocational training of a NGRI patient may be imposed as
1. In several of the cases which we have reviewed the court has ordered the patient to
attend a vocational training program prior to release despite clinical opinion that the pa-




a precondition of release only if the lack of vocational training is
proved to be related to the patient's present dangerousness or
insanity.
The question remains whether vocational training may legiti-
mately be imposed under the conditional release procedure of the
Virginia statute. An examination of the statutory scheme reveals
that in terms of both procedural and substantive due process the
Virginia procedure is constitutionally valid. While the statutory
scheme reveals no due process defect, we believe that as applied
the procedure denies the NGRI equal protection of the law. Voca-
tional training should be imposed upon NGRI patients only on the
same terms as imposed upon civilly committed patients. Since vo-
cational training can be mandated as a condition for the release of
civilly committed patients only upon a showing that the lack of
vocational training is reasonably related to the patient's insanity or
dangerousness, it can be mandated for the NGRI only upon the
same terms.
Specifically, this article addresses the Virginia courts' practice of
requiring insanity acquittees to receive vocational training2 as a
prerequisite to their release. First, this requirement will be ex-
plained and analyzed in light of the provisions of the Virginia
Code.3 Second, its constitutional validity will be examined. Third,
the thesis will be developed that a defendant found not guilty by
reason of insanity may properly be required to participate in a
court ordered vocational training program pursuant to conditional
release procedures, but only in accordance with the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection of the law, that is,
only after a full release hearing and only if vocational training
bears a relationship to the acquittee's mental illness or dangerous-
ness. The conclusion will be developed that the current manner in
which Virginia courts have mandated vocational training for in-
sanity acquittees is constitutionally infirm.
2. Vocational training, for purposes of this article, is defined as attendance at or partici-
pation in a structured program geared toward teaching the participant job skills. The pro-
grams typically offered by such centers include carpentry, food service, light metal working,
mechanical service and repair, and similar occupational programs.
3. The commitment and release procedures for NGRI acquittees are embodied in VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-181 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See text accompanying notes 5 to 20 infra.
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II. RELEASE OF PERSONS ACQUITTED BY REASON OF INSANITY:
VIRGINIA PROCEDURE
For centuries society has employed the state's power to protect
both itself and the individual from mentally ill persons who are
dangerous to themselves or others. Individuals acquitted by reason
of insanity are nearly always committed to a mental institution.4
Section 19.2-181 of the Virginia Code embodies Virginia's proce-
dure for the commitment and release of persons acquitted by rea-
son of insanity.5 Upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity,
the defendant is placed in the temporary custody of the Commis-
sioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation.
Virginia procedure further provides for clinical evaluation and a
judicial hearing after acquittal and prior to commitment of the de-
fendant. If "the defendant is insane or feeble minded or [if] his
discharge would be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to
himself, the court shall order him to be committed."8 The subse-
quent release of the defendant may be secured, upon application to
the committing court, by one of two avenues: (1) by application of
the director of the state hospital in which the person is confined;"
or (2) by application of the committed person. 10 In either event,
[i]f the court is satisfied [on the basis of the evidence] that the com-
mitted person is not insane or feebleminded and that his discharge
or release will not be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to
himself, the court shall order his discharge or release. If the court
is not satisfied, it shall promptly order a hearing to determine
whether the committed person is at that time insane or feeble-
minded and to determine whether his discharge would be danger-
ous to the public peace and safety to himself.1
4. Note, The Virginia Procedure for Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 11 Wi. & MARY L. REV. 185 (1969).
5. For the full text of VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181 (Cum. Supp. 1981), see Appendix.
6. Id. at § 19.2-181 (1).
7. Id. The constitutionality of mandatory commitment statutes has been questioned on
the grounds that the not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) verdict addresses mental state
at the time of the offense whereas commitment addresses present insanity-the two should,
therefore, be independent determinations.
8. Id. at § 19.2-181 (1).
9. Id. at § 19.2-181 (2).
10. Id. at § 19.2-181 (4).
11. Id. at § 19.2-181 (3). (emphasis added). Virginia procedure incorporates both sanity
and non-dangerousness as conditions of release. Many courts have held that an insanity
acquittee may be released upon a showing that the patient is no longer mentally ill. See,
e.g., United States v. Carter, 415 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1975); Warner v. States, 244 N.W.2d
[Vol. 16:543
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Depending upon the court's determination in that hearing, one
of the three possible dispositions of the defendant will be made:
(1) discharge or unconditional release; (2) recommitment; or (3)
upon recommendation of the Commissioner, civil commitment.12 In
a typical civil commitment the patient is treated at the hospital
until the attending physician notes such progress that the patient
is no longer deemed mentally ill or dangerous. The physician may
then release the patient under an appropriate after-care program.
The statute explicitly provides for conditional release of the NGRI
under a modified civil commitment procedure:
[I]n lieu of discharging or releasing, or recommitting the person,
[the court may] permit such person to be treated as a patient com-
mitted pursuant to §§ 37.1-67.1 through 37.1-67.4, [the involuntary
civil commitment provision] subject to such limitations and restric-
tions as the court may deem appropriate and such individual shall
remain under the jurisdiction of the committing court subject to
such modification or additional order as the court may determine
appropriate.13
640 (Minn. 1976). There is authority, however, that considerations of due process and equal
protection require consideration of both mental illness and dangerousness. It should also be
noted that in Virginia both insanity and dangerousness are legal conclusions to be deter-
mined upon a hearing before the committing court.
As of 1976, twenty (20) states based the release determination on either one or both of
these release criteria. German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Per-
sons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGFRS L. REV. 1011 (1976). See also Applica-
tion of Noel, 577 P. 2d 1096 (Kan. 1978) (holding that these are conclusions of law while
noting that Kansas has vacillated over the years between holding release a legal or a medical
conclusion).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981). In practice this recommendation
would be made by the hospital director, upon the advice of those clinicians caring for the
patient.
13. Id. (emphasis added). It is the emphasized clause which preserves the common law
conditional release power. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-67.1 to .4 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provide for
the involuntary civil commitment of an individual. Under § 37.1-67.1 an individual may be
detained and § 37.1-67.2 affords the detainee an opportunity for voluntary civil commit-
ment. As the judge retains jurisdiction over the patient, even if the patient was allowed to
be voluntarily admitted under the provision, the court retains final authority over the pa-
tient's release. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Cur. Supp. 1981). For all practical purposes
therefore commitment under § 37.1-67.2 is the same as an involuntary commitment. Section
37.1-67.3 provides for the involuntary commitment upon judicial hearing. Under § 37.1-67.3
an individual who is not in need of involuntary hospitalization and treatment "shall be sub-
ject to court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, night treatment in
a hospital, referral to a community mental health clinic, or other such appropriate treat-
ment modalities as may be necessary to meet the needs of the individual." VA. CODE ANN. §
37.1-67.3 (Cur. Supp. 1981). Section 37.1-67.4 sets forth the place where hearings are to be
held under §§ 37.1-67.2 and 37.1-67.3. It also addresses services to be provided the patient
during detention as well as liability for costs.
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A. Vocational Training of the Insanity Acquittee: Current
Practice
While the statute provides for the conditional release of persons
acquitted by reason of insanity, the practice of Virginia courts has
not uniformly been to permit the treatment of the acquittee as a
civil committee before imposing such conditions. 4 Instead, in cases
which we have reviewed, courts have required the acquittee to re-
ceive vocational training as a precondition of release. The following
illustration is typical of the cases we have encountered.
David B. is a twenty-five year old black male who is currently
committed to one of Virginia's public mental hospitals, having
been acquitted by reason of insanity of two counts of attempted
rape and two counts of burglary. He has been hospitalized continu-
ously since January, 1976, shortly following his arrest.
Mr. B. reports that he had been a heavy drug user since the age
of thirteen, preferring cocaine and heroin but using other drugs
when these were not available. He dropped out of school after
completing the tenth grade and remained unemployed until his ar-
rest. The charges against Mr. B. grew out of two incidents which
occured ten days apart in the latter part of 1975. On each occasion,
Mr. B. broke into a basement window of the victim's home, dis-
robed, placed a stocking over his head and, wielding a kitchen
knife, located and removed money from the victim's purse. On
both occasions, the victim discovered Mr. B. who then attempted
rape. In each case, Mr. B. reports that he became frightened and
left the house, unclothed, without physically injuring his victim.
His initial hospitalization following his arrest was for evaluation
of his competency to stand trial. At that time he admitted to ex-
periencing auditory hallucinations and told his various examiners
that he was being harrassed by two acquaintances who had forced
him to commit the offenses described above. His speech was often
incoherent, he was subject to unpredictable outbursts of violent
behavior, and he was often found laughing to himself without any
discernable provocation. Both the state's psychiatrists and those
retained by the defense felt that Mr. B. was suffering from schizo-
phrenia and that he was incompetent to stand trial.
Mr. B. was treated with medications appropriately used in cases
of schizophrenia and, gradually, he recovered to the point of com-
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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petency. At his trial in early 1979, the prosecution did not dispute
his defense of insanity. Following a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity on all four of the criminal counts against him, Mr. B.
was committed to one of Virginia's state hospitals. By early 1980,
Mr. B. had recovered to the point where he had no longer exper-
ienced hallucinations or entertained delusional beliefs, was no
longer subject to fits of violent behavior, was able to converse co-
herently at all times, and maintained an emotional state appropri-
ate to his circumstances. At this time, the psychiatrist treating him
described him as being in a state of "fairly good remission."
One year later, in early 1981, Mr. B. petitioned the committing
court for his release pursuant to section 19.2-181 of the Virginia
Code. At this time, he had been free from any signs of major
mental illness for over a year, according to hospital records.
Shortly thereafter, the court issued an order denying the request
and finding Mr. B. to be insane and dangerous to the public peace
and safety. The court further found from the evidence that the de-
fendant's mental disease was in remission and that it appeared
that he would be amenable to a treatment plan incorporating grad-
ual re-entry into the community. The court stated in its order re-
committing him that it would entertain recommendations for a re-
lease program for Mr. B. The court did not, however, structure any
form of conditional release program for Mr. B., and no subsequent
court order for vocational training appears in his record. Mr. B.
says he was told by the judge that he would have to "prove himself
to the court." He was instructed to pursue vocational training
under the direction of the hospital staff, but without a conditional
release. According to Mr. B., the judge commented that he be-
lieved Mr. B. to be safe and sane, but that he just needed to be
sure.
Mr. B. feels that he is safe and sane, yet that he is being pun-
ished. Hospital records confirm that his mental illness has been in
remission for the last two years. He feels that his confinement de-
spite the absence of any illness or need for additional treatment
generates a great deal of stress in his life, and he fears that this
will eventually worsen his psychiatric condition.
Mr. B. has been successfully participating in a vocational reha-
bilitation program for the past year, but remains pessimistic that
he will be released following his next hearing.
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Mr. B.'s situation is similar to others we have reviewed. Clinical
evaluation has found many of these insanity acquittees to be no
longer mentally ill and not dangerous. These individuals are con-
sidered to be dangerous due to the fact that they have no job skills
and little prospect for meaningful stable employment upon release.
Despite restoration to sanity, it is sometimes considered unwise to
release such persons, even conditionally. The judge is often reluc-
tant to return to society an individual whom he considers to lack
the tools to support himself. Accordingly, conditions have been im-
posed on such persons before they are released from confinement.
In these situations, despite the facts presented at the hearing, the
judge sometimes issues an order finding the individual insane and
dangerous. The acquittee is recommitted and the court directs that
he receive vocational training without a formalized conditional re-
lease.15 The effect of this procedure is to precondition the defen-
dant's release from the hospital upon receipt of vocational training.
The patient's NGRI status is maintained and the statutory scheme
for conditional release bypassed.
B. Statutory Compatibility of the Vocational Training
Requirement
If the vocational training requirement is to be compatible with
the Virginia statutory scheme, the lack of vocational training must
relate to the standard for release set forth in section 19.2-181. As-
suming that the court has determined not to release the patient
until the patient has received vocational training, that decision
must be made in light of one of two dispositions of the NGRI as
discussed above: (1) criminal recommitment' 6 or (2) involuntary
civil commitment.' 7 To require vocational training of an NGRI pa-
tient pursuant to a criminal recommitment is to effectively make
that training a precondition of release. Pursuant to the involuntary
civil commitment procedure, the requirement falls within the
15. In one particularly onerous application of this technique, the NGRI was directed to
enroll in a specific rehabilitation program. The rehabilitation center, however, refused the
patient's application for admission on grounds of dangerousness, although the only evidence
of dangerousness was the act for which he had been originally committed two years earlier.
This lack of adequate statement of the release conditions placed the training center in a
position to make the ultimate legal determination of dangerousness.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Cur. Supp. 1981). See text accompanying notes 1-9
supra.




court's power to conditionally release the NGRI patient., s
1. Vocational Training As a Precondition of Release
Under the criminal recommitment procedure, if the committed
person is no longer insane or feebleminded and if that person's dis-
charge would not be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to
himself that person must be released.19 When an insanity acquittee
has satisfied the statutory criteria of sanity and nondangerousness,
further confinement is illegal and habeas corpus will lie to obtain
the pateint's release.20 As the purpose of the detention of the
NGRI is to achieve the treatment goal of making that person sane
and not dangerous, it would appear proper for the court to impose
such treatment which would help achieve that goal. The lack of
vocational skills, if related to either the NGRI patient's insanity or
dangerousness, could legitimately be identified as a proper target
for preconditional release requirements. If the individual's voca-
tional skill level is not related to either of the statutory criteria,
the imposition of vocational training participation as a prerequisite
for release is wholly unjustified. While the social engineering goals
of such an effort may be lauded, if not justified by its relationship
to either insanity or dangerousness, mandatory vocational training
is proper only as a condition of release and should be imposed only
through the procedure set forth in section 19.2-18(3) of the statute.
a. Insanity
The question of whether the vocational training requirement
bears on the issue of continuing insanity hinges on two more lim-
ited questions: (1) whether vocational training21 constitutes treat-
ment for mental illness, and if so (2) whether the absence of such
skills as might be developed by a program of vocational training
continues to render an individual mentally ill.
18. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-181(3), 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2) (Curn. Supp. 1981).
20. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 54, 58-59 (1964).
21. Because of the lack of a standardized terminology in the rehabilitative disciplines we
have used the terms "vocational training" and "vocational rehabilitation" synonymously. In
some authors' usage, "vocational rehabilitation" includes more than teaching job skills and
involves attempts to improve the client's "self-determination, self-care ... and em-
ployability" among other goals. G. WRIGHT, TOTAL REHABILITATION 17 (1980). In practice,
the range of services offered by Virginia's agencies of this type seems to vary.
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(1) Vocational Training As Treatment for Mental Illness
Although vocational training is commonly offered to individuals
hospitalized due to a severe mental disorder, there is little agree-
ment within the rehabilitation disciplines whether such services
might reasonably be viewed as treatment. The terms "vocational
training," "vocational rehabilitation," "work adjustment," and "vo-
cational counseling" are ambiguous and at times are used inter-
changeably. One authority has noted that "the rehabilitation
nonmenclature is unstandardized because many of its words are
derived from other disciplines and are contaminated by varied uses
a universal, scientific vocabulary designating explicit names
for rehabilitation concepts has not yet been authoritatively ex-
pounded. 2 2 One writer has gone so far as to describe the field's
terminology as "a babel of tongues. 23
As an illustration of the jungle of terminology one encounters in
these fields, consider the following definition of "work adjust-
ment," appearing in a United States Government publication:
Work adjustment is a treatment/training process utilizing ildividual
and group work, or work related activities, to assist individuals in
understanding the meaning, value and demands of work; to modify
or develop attitudes, personal characteristics, and work behavior;
and to develop functional capacities, as required, in order to assist
individuals toward their optimum level of vocational development.24
In defining this term in an introductory text, however, one au-
thor, who appears to eschew a medical model of rehabilitation ser-
vices, cites the above source and yet modifies it in a manner crucial
to our concerns:
Work adjustment. A training process which involves individuals
and groups in work related activities to help them understand the
meaning, value, and demands of work in general and to modify or
develop their attitudes, personal characteristics, work behaviors, and
functional capacities as required for achieving their optimal level of
22. Id. at 8.
23. S. FEINGOLD, THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABLrrY PROGRAM: A
GUIDE FOR THE PRACTITIONER 39 (1969).
24. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REHABILITATION SERvIcEs AD-
MIN., TENTH INSTITUTE ON REHABILITATION SERVICES, VOCATIONAL EVALUATION AND WORK AD-




While the medical matters of illness and its treatment are of
concern to rehabilitation professionals, the theoretical underpin-
nings of the field of rehabilitation derive rather from a wide range
of purely interpersonal and sociological theories.26 Thus, turning to
the rehabilitation literature itself will not yield an adequate answer
to the question we have posed.
A more useful approach to this question may be drawn from a
conceptual framework derived from the field of public health and
most carefully linked to mental health problems by Gerald
Caplan.27 In Caplan's conceptualization, mental health services are
viewed as directed toward three goals: primary, secondary and ter-
tiary prevention. According to Caplan, services may be aimed at
reducing "(1) the incidence of mental disorders of all types in a
community ('primary prevention'), (2) the duration of a significant
number of those disorders which do occur ('secondary prevention'),
and (3) the impairment which may result from these disorders
('tertiary prevention').1 28 For our purposes, the distinction be-
tween secondary and tertiary prevention is pertinent.
In Caplan's analysis, which has gained broad acceptance in con-
temporary psychiatry,29 effective treatment is seen as an aspect of
prevention since it contributes, along with early diagnosis, to an
overall reduction in the prevalence of the disorders in question.30
Since one manner of reducing the overall prevalence of a disorder
is to reduce the duration of individual patients' episodes of the dis-
order,3 1 psychiatric treatment falls within the rubric of secondary
prevention. 2
Tertiary prevention, on the other hand, is not seen as directed at
reducing the prevalence of illness. Instead, Caplan restricts the
term to "reducing the rate of residual defect, the lowered capacity
to contribute to the occupational and social life of the community
25. J. BrrrIE, INTRODUCTION TO REHABILITATION II - (1979) (emphasis added).
26. See J. Dunham & C. Dunham, Psychosocial Aspects of Disability, in DIsABLrrY AND
REHABILITATION HANDBOOK (R. Goldenson ed. 1978).
27. See G. CAPLAN, PRINCIPLES OF PREVENTIVE PSYCHIATRY (1964).
28. Id. at 16-17.
29. See, e.g., H. Spiro's discussion in A. FREEDMAN et a[., COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 2859-62 (3d ed. 1980).
30. G. CAPLAN, supra note 27, at 105.
31. MA XEY-RoSENAU, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 6 (P. Sartwell ed.) (1973).
32. G. CAPLAN, supra note 27, at 105-08.
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which continues after the mental disorder has ended.3 3 It is under
the rubric of tertiary prevention that vocational training falls, in
Caplan's analysis.3 4 Indeed, efforts that are directed to individuals
whose disorders have ended are not generally seen in medicine as
constituting treatment, but rather prophylaxis.3 5 In this light, vo-
cational services, however effective they may be in promoting the
social readjustment of psychiatric patients, do not constitute treat-
ment. Further, individuals such as Mr. B., during the time they are
experiencing the range of serious symptoms described earlier,
profit poorly from vocational services.3 In fact, in Mr. B.'s case,
these services were not offered to him until the symptoms of his
disorder had disappeared and he was viewed as no longer mentally
ill by those clinicians responsible for his care.
(2) The Absence of Vocational Skills and Mental Illness
While vocational training may or may not be viewed as consti-
tuting treatment, the mandatory provision of such services to in-
sanity acquittees should hinge on whether such services are re-
quired to render the individual no longer mentally ill. This, in
turn, derives from the question of whether, in the absence of other
symptoms of mental disorder, an individual who lacks occupational
training remains mentally ill. The meaning and utility of the con-
cepts of mental health and mental illness have been subject to con-
siderable debate both within the psychiatric community and in the
legal literature.3 7 However, since the publication in 1980 of the
third edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,3 8 practitioners in
both psychiatry and law have had at their disposal a series of crite-
rion-based definitions for mental disorders which have been shown
to yield acceptable levels of reliability in their application." In-
33. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 118-20.
35. This would be true even when the same chemical agents are involved in treating a
disorder and preventing its recurrence. For example, see the discussion of prophylaxis of
depression in C. BOWDEN & M. GIFFEN, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY FOR PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIANS
33 (1978).
36. FIsH's SCHIZOPHRENIA 136 (2d ed. M. Hamilton 1976).
37. See, e.g., T. SZASz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (rev. ed. 1974); Ennis & Litwack,
Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF.
L. REv. 693 (1974).
38. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) (hereinafter cited as DSM-III).
39. Id. at 467-72.
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deed this manual (commonly referred to as the DSM-III) has pro-
vided American psychiatry with the first criterion-based guide to
deciding whether an individual is suffering from a particular
mental disorder.40 It is thus feasible to examine the DSM-III to
determine whether the vocationally unrehabilitated individual con-
tinues to suffer from a particular disorder.
As an illustration, let us consider the example of schizophrenia,
the disorder from which Mr. B. suffered. The only criterion for the
"active phase" of the disorder which involves occupational func-
tioning is as follows: "Deterioration from a previous level of func-
tioning in such areas as work, social relations, and self-care.""' In
order for such a condition to be diagnosed as schizophrenia, how-
ever, other signs and symptoms all must be present as well.,2
These additional signs and symptoms all relate to severe abnor-
malities of mental functioning, such as delusions, hallucinations,
and incoherence of speech.4" Deterioration of vocational function-
ing alone would not permit the diagnosis of schizophrenia in its
active phase. Further, if no vocational skills have ever been devel-
oped by an individual, no deterioration in them could be adduced
and this particular criterion could not be used in diagnosing that
individual as schizophrenic.
A "residual phase" of schizophrenia is also described which may
persist after the active phase has terminated. One of the criteria
for this residual phase (in an individual with a history of having
experienced the active phase) is a "marked impairment in role
functioning as wage-earner, student or homemaker." '44 Again, how-
ever, in order for such an impairment to be indicative of schizo-
phrenia in its residual phase, at least one other symptom must be
present as well, including, among others, "markedly peculiar be-
havior (e.g., collecting garbage, talking to self in public, hording
food) . . . blunted, flat, or inappropriate affect ... unusual
perceptual experiences, e.g., recurrent illusions, sensing the pres-
ence of a force or person not actually present." 5 Even in an indi-
vidual with a history of active schizophrenia, vocational impair-
40. Compare AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MEtN.AL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) (hereinafter cited as DSM-II) with DSM-III, supra
note 38. In DSM-II no criteria, only brief descriptions of disorders, are provided.
41. DSM-III, supra note 38, at 189.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 188.
44. Id. at 189.
45. Id.
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ment alone does not allow one to be categorized as experiencing
the residual phase, even if it were to represent a deterioration, as it
must to qualify as a symptom in the first instance.
An individual is "in remission" when he or she "now is free of all
signs of the illness. '4 6 This places in an ambiguous status the indi-
vidual with a single symptom remaining who, for that reason, could
not be classified as experiencing either the active or residual
phases (which each require more than one symptom) and yet who
could not be characterized as "in remission." For those individuals
like Mr. B. who never had attained any vocational skills in advance
of becomming ill, however, continued vocational incapacity could
not be viewed as a "sign of the illness" since, as we have seen, any
vocational impairment must represent a deterioration in function-
ing before it would constitute a criterion of the illness. Thus, the
individual who had never attained adequate vocational adjustment
and was free of other signs of schizophrenia must be seen as "in
remission" and perhaps as experiencing no mental illness, a condi-
tion for which no criteria are provided in DSM-III.
A similar analysis carried out with other DSM-III diagnoses
leads to the same result: lifelong vocational incapacity alone, even
in an individual who formerly satisfied other diagnostic criteria for
the disorder in question, is insufficient to continue to render that
individual mentally ill. Indeed, for every disorder other than schiz-
ophrenia, even the aftermath of a deterioration in vocational func-
tioning cannot by itself be construed as evidence of continuing
mental disorder. For the great majority of insanity acquittees then,
if vocational training is to be justified as a precondition of release,
it must be justified under the statutory criterion of
dangerousness.47
b. Dangerousness
In the general case, we cannot assume, without adequate proof,
that vocational training bears a sufficient relationship to insanity
to justify its imposition as a precondition of release. Therefore, if
46. Id. at 193.
47. American psychiatry is far more likely than is British or European psychiatry to see
deterioration of social functioning as evidence of illness. See, e.g., Lewis, Health as a Social
Concept, 4 BRIT. J. Soc. 109-24 (1953) (use of poor vocational functioning as a sign of illness
called into further question). See also FIsH's SCHIZOPHRENIA, supra note 36, at 26-69 for a
discussion by British psychiatrist Max Hamilton of the symptoms of schizophrenia. No
mention by Hamilton is made of deterioration in vocational functioning.
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vocational training is to be justified as such, it must be under the
concept of dangerousness. Does a lack of vocational skills render
an individual more dangerous than he would be if vocationally
trained? If so, how much more dangerous? In order to understand
the relationship of vocational training to dangerousness, we must
first examine the process by which we access dangerousness.
The clinical prediction of dangerousness is one of the most per-
plexing and controversial issues in mental health law. What is dan-
gerousness? How dangerous does a patient have to be in order to
justify continued confinement? The concept of dangerousness is
heavily relied on in almost every state's mental health laws, yet the
concept remains ill defined and greatly misunderstood.
Although Virginia Code section 19.2-181 vaguely identifies cer-
tain factors in relation to which dangerousness is to be measured,48
section 19.2-181 offers no clear definition of the standards by
which dangerousness is assessed. It is with a heavy burden of defi-
nitional uncertainty and imprecision that the mental health pro-
fessional undertakes to ascertain the dangerousness of a patient.
This burden of uncertainty cannot but impair the accuracy of
clinical prediction of dangerousness.
The clinical prediction of violent behavior is inherently inaccu-
rate.4 While authorities differ on the precise level of the defects in
predictive reliability, it is clear that the mental health profession-
als are highly inaccurate at predicting violent behavior.5 Estimates
of the predictive accuracy of clinical evaluation hover around forty
to fifty percent.51
Cocozza and Steadman, addressing this issue, have concluded:
In sum, we would hesitate to conclude that the evidence proves be-
yond a reasonable doubt the inability of psychiatrists or anyone else
to predict accurately. We nevertheless feel strongly that on the basis
of the series of direct and indirect studies reviewed, there is cer-
tainly a preponderance of evidence which, when coupled with [our
findings], would probably constitute clear and convincing proof.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
49. See J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981) (previously published as U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior
(1981)); Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Proof, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1085 (1976).
50. Compare Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 49 with MONAHAN, supra note 49.
51. MONAHAN, supra note 49, at 28.
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* . . With few exceptions . . . there is no empirical evidence to
support the position that psychiatrists have any special expertise in
accurately predicting dangerousness.52
Despite the inherent unreliability of psychiatric techniques, the
use of the concept of dangerousness remains pervasive in the invol-
untary commitment and differential treatment of mental pa-
tients.5 If we must embrace a concept so inaccurate as dangerous-
ness, how might we improve its accuracy?
Monahan has developed the thesis that the clinical prediction of
dangerousness can be greatly enhanced by the infusion of statisti-
cal and environmental factors.54 Statistical factors are used to
identify a class of individuals of which the patient is a member.
Using the data available on the class of persons, an actuarial pre-
diction of the patient's dangerousness is undertaken. Monahan
identifies several principal statistical correlates of future violent
behavior:
(1) Past crime particularly violent crime-The probability of fu-
ture crime increases with each criminal act.55
(2) Age-"As violence feeds on the energy of youth, so age mellows
even the most habitual offender." Not only present age, but age at
first police contact is important as well.
(3) Sex-Males commit the vast majority of violent crimes.
(4) Race-Blacks have a disproportionately high rate of arrests for
violent crimes and non-whites generally have a disproportionately
high rate over whites.
(5) Socioeconomic status and employment stability-pre-prison in-
come levels and the stability of pre-prison employment appear to be
significant in predicting successful release.
(6) Opiate or alcohol abuse-The use of narcotics and alcohol in
combination significantly increases the risk of violence, although al-
cohol alone has tended to have no effect.56
Monahan also employs environmental factors as situational
predictors of dangerous behavior. 57 Acccording to this model, the
52. Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 49, at 1099.
53. Id. at 1100.
54. MONAHAN, supra note 49.
55. See also S. PFOHL, PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS (1978); Kirshner, Constitutional Stan-
dards for Release of The Civilly Committed and not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Strict
Scrutiny Analysis, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 233 (1978).
56. MONAHAN, supra note 49, at 104-13.
57. Id. at 129-41.
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clinical prediction of dangerousness should further be guided by a
comparison of the characteristics of the environment in which the
person has been violent in the past with the characteristics of the
environments in which the person will live in the future. The simi-
larities between the two environments should serve as an indicator
of the risk of violence.5 8
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Application of Noel,59 pictur-
esquely phrased the issue by analogy:
Let us suppose a court is called upon to determine whether a ship-
ment of nitroglycerin can be stored in the center of a large city. The
experts testify that nitroglycerin is not dangerous as long as it is
stored at temperatures below 180 degrees Fahrenheit and is not jig-
gled. No evidence is admitted as to the conditions under which the
nitroglycerin is proposed to be kept, or supervision thereof. It would
obviously be error for the court to conclude the explosive presented
no risk as long as it [sic] needs were met, and to delegate determina-
tion of proper conditions to others.60
Monahan reports six major situational correlates of violent
behavior.
(1) Family Environment-The family environment may be critical
in supporting or discouraging violent behavior.
(2) Peer Environment-Association with the same peers who in
the past encouraged violence may indicate future violence to the ex-
tent violent behavior has occurred in a specific social context.
(3) Job Environment-Once again pre-prison income levels and
employment stability are important.
(4) Availability of Victims-Victim-specific violence may reduce
the likelihood of future violence.
(5) Availability of Weapons-Weapons may influence the severity
and lethality of violent behavior.
(6) Availability of Alcohol-To the extent that violence has been
correlated with alcohol in the past, excessive use of alcohol by a peer
group may encourage future violence.6 1
It is essential to note that the same variable, i.e., pre-arrest in-
come level and stability of pre-arrest employment, is identified by
58. Id.
59. 226 Kan. 536, 601 P.2d 1152 (1979).
60. Id. at -, 601 P.2d at 1167.
61. MONAHAN, supra note 49, at 132-37.
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Monahan in each set of variables. This is the only correlate
Monahan identifies which is relevant to vocational training. In-
deed, this single correlate is not identified as one of the most criti-
cal. By far, the most important correlate of violent behavior identi-
fied by Monahan and others is a past history of violent behavior.2
It is also essential to keep the relevant inquiry in proper focus.
What is at issue is not the ability to successfully complete a voca-
tional training program but the need for vocational training in or-
der to secure stable and satisfying employment. Addressing aspects
of the parole system, one commentator has noted:
The principal underlying assumption behind vocational rehabili-
tation has been that the reason that many persons have turned to
crime is that they lacked the job skills necessary to compete in the
labor market .... It is not noticed that there are many in the same
circumstances who never turn to crime and who often work menial
jobs all their lives. It is not asked whether the difference between
those who commit crimes and those who do not is more often one of
attitude rather than training ....
A favorable attitude toward work itself is probably even more im-
portant than the acquisition of job skills.... Problems [are] not
always related to insufficient training. Rather typical problems [in-
volve] frequent job changes, lengthy periods of unemployment, and
interpersonal problems with bosses and peers.63
Clearly then, emphasis on vocational training instead of the sta-
bility and personal satisfaction of employment misleads the in-
quiry into dangerousness. Further, it must be recalled that, while
stability of employment is statistically associated with violent be-
havior, authorities disagree as to the utility of actuarial data when
applied to the individual case. Another author has stated:
Where this [acturarial] reasoning seriously trips is in prediction ap-
plied to the single case instead of to a population of cases. A factual
nonsequitur occurs in the reasoning that if 80 percent of delinquents
who come from broken homes are recidivists, then this delinquent
from a broken home has an 80 percent change of becoming a recidi-
vist. The truth of the matter is that this delinquent has either 100
percent certainty of becoming a repeater or 100 percent certainty of
going straight .... Indeed, psychological causation is always per-
62. Id.




sonal and never actuarial .... 64
Given these concerns, it would appear that the clinical assertion
that the "individual remains dangerous because he has poor voca-
tional skills" is an enormously tenuous one. Just how close is the
relationship between vocational training and dangerousness? Voca-
tional training is merely one aspect of a wide range of environmen-
tal factors which comprise the criteria of dangerousness.6 5 There is
a great deal of controversy surrounding the closeness of the rela-
tionship between vocational training and dangerousness. 6 It is
clear that "[t]he acquisition of new vocational skills will not solve
personal problems related to employment that are of a psychologi-
cal nature. '6 7 While it would appear that holding a steady job is
both satisfying and supportive, the available "data [do] not prove a
causal relationship between employment and crime."6 8 While the
relationship between vocational training and dangerousness ap-
pears to be closer than the relationship between vocational training
and insanity, it is nevertheless attenuated at best. Such a relation-
ship cannot justify the use of vocational training as the sole crite-
rion of dangerousness in assessing the suitability of a defendant for
release.
It is possible that in some instances an individual's insanity or
dangerousness may be directly related to a lack of vocational skills.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we believe that the relationship is
weak, at least in the vast majority of cases. If the state could show
that the individual's lack of vocational training was related to ei-
ther of the two criteria, vocational training could constitute a valid
precondition of release. This relationship should be determined by
the state at the patient's release hearing by a sufficient quantum of
evidence. In the typical case, this relationship will not exist. If it
cannot be shown to exist, vocational training is not a valid precon-
dition of release and may not be required of the NGRI patient in
the absence of statutory conditional release procedures.
64. MONAHAN, supra note 49, at 98-99 (quoting P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL
PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 20 (1954)).
65. MONAHAN, supra note 49. Vocational training is often given relatively little impor-
tance in this hierarchy of criteria.
66. Compare MONAHAN, supra note 49 with Lopez, supra note 63.
67. Lopez, supra note 63, at 569.
68. MONAHAN, supra note 49, at 135.
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2. Vocational Training as a Condition of Release
While vocational training may not constitute a legitimate crite-
rion of dangerousness or insanity, it may very well be legitimate as
a condition of release. Virginia statutes preserve the court's com-
mon law power to grant conditional release.69 There is substantial
authority for the proposition that vocational training may properly
be imposed as a condition of release.7 ° In general, any temporary
release should be treated as a conditional release, and an appropri-
ate court order must issue. 71
In Virginia, in order to exercise its conditional release authority,
the court must first transfer the NGRI to civil commitment. The
failure of Virginia practice to comply with the statutory scheme
supports the invalidity of the preconditional vocational training re-
lease criteria.
Under current Virginia practice, the vocational training require-
ment is employed as a precondition of release and not as a condi-
tion of release. The authorities discussed in the preceding section
indicate that vocational training may be imposed only as a condi-
tion of release. The importance of this distinction involves the in-
herent due process and equal protection safeguards which flow
from a full hearing. Of key importance in this regard is the re-
quirement of adequate findings of fact to support the imposition of
conditional release requirements.7 2 Let us now examine the consti-
tutionality of Virginia Code section 19.2-181 and the vocational
training requirement pursuant to a conditional release."3
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RELEASE PROVISION OF THE
VIRGINIA STATUTE: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
At stake in the confinement of the NGRI is the fundamental
69. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-181(3), 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Nineteen (19) states have
statutory provisions for conditional release. Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 49, at 1076-79.
70. United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Zion v. Xanthopoulos, 585
P.2d 1084 (Mont. 1978). Contra, Scheidt v. Meredith, 307 F. Supp. 63 (D. Colo. 1970) (hold-
ing that educational conditions are inappropriate and may not be imposed).
71. See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 97 (1964).
72. United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McNeil, 434
F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Miller v. Blalock, 411 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1969); Hough v. United
States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Application of Noel, 226 Kan. 536, 601 P.2d 1152
(1979).
73. For an interesting and comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Kirschner, supra
note 55, at 235 n.20 (suggesting the applicability of strict scrutiny analysis). See also Annot.,
2 A.L.R.4th 934 (1981).
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right of liberty. The state's interest in the deprivation of this fun-
damental interest can be justified only if both the interest fur-
thered by confinement is substantial and the procedure by which
the individual is deprived of liberty accords the NGRI due process
of law.7 4 Before we examine the constitutionality of the conditional
release procedure, it is necessary to first establish that the statu-
tory scheme embodying that procedure is constitutionally valid.
Once the constitutionality of the statutory scheme is established,
the constitutionality of the vocational training requirement can
then be examined. At this point, it is appropriate to analyze the
procedures employed in Virginia that implicate the deprivation of
the NGRI's fundamental interest in liberty.
75
The Virginia procedure has withstood constitutional attack upon
its procedural adequacy.76 In fact, section 19.2-181 of the Virginia
Code affords significantly broader procedural protection to the
NGRI than do other statutory schemes which have been held con-
stitutionally valid in other jurisdictions. 7
Section 19.2-181 provides the NGRI a broad variety of procedu-
ral safeguards at the release phase.7 8 Release proceedings are initi-
ated either by application of the director of the state hospital in
which the patient is confined or annually by petition of the com-
mittee.79 The committee is guaranteed under section 19.2-181(3) a
full hearing on the issues of sanity and dangerousness. In that pro-
ceeding, the burden of proof is on the committee to prove that the
NGRI is not insane, feebleminded or dangerous to himself.80 Addi-
tionally, the Virginia procedure preserves the right of the commit-
74. See text accompanying notes 92-157 infra.
75. The discussion will address the adequacy of due process protection afforded the
NGRI at the release stage. No attempt is made to grapple with the panoply of due process
concerns which arise in respect to such related issues as commitment and confinement.
76. See Harris v. Ballone, No. 80-686-N, slip op. at - (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 1981).
77. See generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 54 (1964).
78. See text accompanying notes 1-9 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
80. In most states, the applicant for release bears the burden of proof. 21 AM. Jur. 2d
Criminal Law § 93 (1981). Whether that burden is based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence or clear and convincing proof, or beyond a reasonable doubt standard is an issue
which remains to be determined. Many states have settled on proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606, (D.C. Cir. 1973) (burden of proof held
to be by preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt.) While the
burden is clearly on the petitioner in Virginia, it is impossible to tell from a reading of the
'cases just what the level of that burden is. See also Blalock v. Markley, 207 Va. 1003, 154
S.E.2d 158 (1967), where the burden was placed on plaintiff but was not articulated. See
generally 10A MICHIE'S JuR. Insane and Other Incompetent Persons § 5 (1978).
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tee to petition for a writ of habeas corpus."s
The Virginia statute, by preserving three avenues for the com-
mittee to challenge continued confinement,"2 is significantly
broader than the NGRI statutes in force in many states.8 3 Where it
is provided by statute that the committee may either apply for a
certification of the physician in charge for an examination or peti-
tion the court directly, exclusive of the remedy of habeas corpus,
and the NGRI is guaranteed a jury trial on the issue of sanity, that
statute has been held valid.84 While Virginia does not provide for
jury trial, the committee is guaranteed a judicial hearing on the
sanity issue.8 5 Even in situations where the committee is not guar-
anteed a judicial hearing regarding the petition, the statute pre-
serves the remedy of habeas corpus and has withstood due process
challenge.8 " The flexibility of approach to the court coupled with
the guarantee of a judicial hearing insulate the Virginia statute
from constitutional attack on its face.
The statute survived direct challenge in Harris v. Ballone,"
where the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that section
19.2-181 of the Virginia Code was unconstitutional and an injunc-
tion restraining its enforcement. Relying on the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff
in Harris alleged denial of procedural due process and substantive
due process and denial of equal protection. 9 The court held that
section 19.2-181 was valid and dismissed plaintiff's complaint.90
While other Virginia cases have discussed the infirmity of the
procedures as applied to a particular case and have awarded re-
lief,.1 it appears that the procedures set forth in section 19.2-181
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
82. The three avenues for the committee to challenge continued confinement are applica-
tion of the director of the state hospital in which the person is confined, annual petition of
the committee, and habeas corpus. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2), (4), (5).
83. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 54, 73-85 (1964).
84. Id. at 73.
85. It has been held that the right to trial by jury is distinguished from judicial hearing's
material in terms of due process protection in the setting of release of NGRI committee. Id.
86. Id. at 81-84. (See particularly the District of Columbia cases cited therein).
87. This is not to say that a procedural due process attack would not be successful against
the Virginia statute as applied in a particular case. Rather, the procedure set forth by the
statute, if followed, is adequate to assure due process of law.
88. No. 80-686-N (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 1981).
89. Id. slip op. at 5.
90. Id. slip op. at 15.
91. Challenges to the constitutionality of the Virginia procedure have been raised in a
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clearly satisfy constitutional requirements. This does not answer
the question, however, of application of the statute to facts in a
given case. Given the amount of discretion vested in the commit-
ting court to formulate conditions of release, the handling of an
individual case under the statute may implicate due process or
equal protection interests as applied.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY VOCATIONAL
TRAINING OF INSANITY ACQUITTEES PURSUANT TO A CONDITIONAL
RELEASE STATUTE
Two fundamental constitutional challenges may be brought
against Virginia's statutory conditional release procedure, as ap-
plied: (1) due process; 2 and (2) equal protection of the law.9
A. Due Process
Every justification for involuntary confinement invokes due pro-
cess considerations.9 4 Critical in due process analysis is the deter-
mination of whether a particular right, which might be infringed
upon by the state, requires strict judicial scrutiny or a less rigorous
rational basis scrutiny.9 5 Strict judicial scrutiny requires that state
intrusion into the protected liberty be justified by a compelling
state interest and that the intrusion be the least restrictive alterna-
tive means of accomplishing the compelling interest. Rational basis
scrutiny requires only that it is rational to believe that the in-
number of cases. These cases have involved instances in which the appropriate procedure
set forth in the statute was not followed, allegedly denying the NGRI patient his constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., Miller v. Blalock, 411 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1969) (conclusory finding of
insanity and subsequent confinement to a mental hospital with no facts to show accused
could assist in his own defense was a denial of due process); Williams v. Blalock, 280 F.
Supp. 298 (W.D. Va. 1968) (denial to defendant of benefit of counsel and expert testimony
to challenge superintendent's testimony was denial of constitutional rights to notice and
hearing).
92. See U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV.
93. See id. amend. XIV.
94. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 243.
95. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973). Often criti-
cal in the resolution of a due process challenge is whether the rational basis or strict scru-
tiny analysis applies. In this article our conclusion that vocational training may be required
only if it bears some relationship to the patient's mental condition or dangerousness is sup-
ported under either analysis. The selection of one over the other is largely irrelevant to our
conclusion. However, strict scrutiny analysis, while not adopted by the courts in this con-
text, appears the more cogent selection and we therefore present the argument in support of
its adoption.
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fringement promotes a legitimate government interest 6 To arrive
at the proper due process standard for release from confinement,
the threshold determinations should be whether the right to be
free from confinement is deserving of strict judicial scrutiny.97 The
Supreme Court, in Matthews v. Eldridge,9 8 announced a frame-
work of analysis for determining what procedural protections a
particular situation demands. The court set forth a three part
analysis requiring the consideration of three factors: (1) the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safe-
guards; and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional substitute procedures
would entail.9
This procedure has been widely followed particularly in the pa-
role context."' While the private interest in Matthews was sub-
stantial the risk of deprivation was not and the costs of additional
procedures were high. In the context of mandatory vocational
training of insanity acquittees pursuant to a conditional release
statute, both the patient's interest and the risk of deprivation are
quite compelling, despite the added costs to the state. The analysis
utilized in Matthews therefore weighs heavily in favor of affording
strong protections to patients like Mr. B.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez °1 con-
firms the concept that the importance of the right at stake does
not, by itself, require strict scrutiny in the constitutional scheme.
Rather, a right is fundamental if it receives explicit or implicit rec-
ognition in the text of the Constitution." 2 Because the right to be
free from confinement is central to liberty, liberty is a fundamental
right given specific protection in the Constitution.0 "
On what grounds must confinement be justified? A person may
be a member of an unusually dangerous class of people, but this
96. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 251.
97. Id.
98. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (no deprivation of due process to terminate disability benefits
under Social Security Act without judicial hearing).
99. Id. at 335.
100. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correction Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979).
101. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
102. Id. at 33.
103. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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alone will not justify confinement.104 The state may not involunta-
rily confine an individual to improve his living standard or to pro-
tect its citizens from exposure to people with harmless but peculiar
habits.10 5 Vocational training, therefore, cannot be imposed merely
to upgrade the acquittee's life style. An examination of civil com-
mitment due process considerations will be valuable in determin-
ing on what basis confinement is'legitimized.
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has not explic-
itly stated what level of judicial protection is mandated by the
massive deprivation of rights which civil commitment entails.10 6
Courts have generally held that, as a matter of substantive due
process, the state cannot "confine individuals in furtherance of in-
terests that are concededly rational but nothing more. '107 The con-
tinuing liberty interest of individuals properly civilly committed
has resulted in strict scrutiny protection. Criminals detained
longer than their maximum sentence likewise have received signifi-
cant judicial protection.108 The law has long proceeded on the pre-
mise that the insanity acquittee stands between the convicted and
the civilly committed individual.10 9 If dangerousness to self or
others is sufficient justification for initial commitment, and if the
nature and duration of confinement must bear a reasonable rela-
tion to these justifications, then the continuing validity of confine-
ment must be judged by the existence vel non of the original justi-
fications for commitment.110
Even if the infringement is justified, the concept of fundamental
rights requires that necessary infringements take place only in the
least restrictive way consistent with the state's compelling inter-
est.11 When a state's compelling interest in confinement no longer
exists, those persons should be released. The state must prove in-
sanity and dangerousness in order to have a compelling interest.
When those acts are no longer recent, the confinement is no longer
104. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 243. But see, MONAHAN, supra note 49, at 115 ("mental
patients without an arrest record prior to going to the hospital have a lower than average
arrest rate for violent crime once they get out of the hospital").
105. O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
106. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 253. See 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
107. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 256.
108. Id. at 257.
109. See Addington v. Texas, 435 U.S. 967 (1978).
110. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 257.
111. Id. at 258.
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justified.'12 It follows that least restrictive means analysis prevents
the continued confinement of the patient who needs only voca-
tional training before being allowed to return to society. The state
simply has no compelling interest in confinement of an individual
who is that close to release as the liberty interest of the NGRI is
identical to that of the committed or convicted.'13
Two schools of thought have emerged in the case law regarding
the type of conditions that may be imposed on the release of an
insanity acquittee's consonant with due process. Some cases advo-
cate the principle that the state's power over the NGRI will not
support the imposition of any conditions of release. Other deci-
sions advocate that only those conditions which are therapeutic, as
distinguished from penal, may be imposed.
1. The Constitution Prohibits the Imposition of Any Conditions
on the Release of Insanity Acquittees
There is authority for the proposition that it is a violation of due
process to place any conditions on the release of an individual who
has been acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity where the per-
son has since been determined to be sane.114 By virtue of the not
guilty by reason of insanity verdict, the individual is not a criminal
and cannot, therefore, be treated as one because of due process
requirements.
In Holderbaum v. Watkins,"' the Court of Appeals of Allen
County, Ohio, held that the imposition of any conditions or qualifi-
cations upon the release of a man who has been found not guilty
by reason of insanity would unconstitutionally deny him equal pro-
tection, deprive him of his liberty without due process of law, and
deprive him of the right to enjoy liberty."' The court found that a
petitioner, who has not been convicted of any crime and is not suf-
fering under any disability under law, is entitled to his uncondi-
tional release. The court felt that any conditions or qualifications
upon the release of a NGRI who was found to be sane pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus is unconstitutional as contrary to the fifth
112. Id.
113. Id. at 262.
114. Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 933 (1980); 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 90 (1981).
115. 44 Ohio App. 2d 253, 73 Ohio Ops. 2d 256, 337 N.E.2d 800, aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 42 Ohio St. 2d 372, 71 Ohio Ops. 2d 333, 328 N.E.2d 814 (1974).
116. 44 Ohio App. 2d at_, 73 Ohio Ops. 2d at -, 337 N.E.2d at 802.
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and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.117
It is interesting to note, however, that the principle articulated
in Holderbaum has not been widely embraced. In fact, while
affirming the trial court's decision on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Ohio vacated that portion of the trial court's holding which found
the Ohio statute permitting conditional release to be
unconstitutional.118
The trial court in Powell v. Genung119 also held that it was with-
out authority to impose conditions on the release of an insanity
acquittee. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court supported this
holding: "the trial court had no continuing jurisdiction over peti-
tioner subsequent to his commitment ... and those portions of
[the trial court orders] making petitioner's release conditioned
upon further court order . . . were made without authority of
law. '1 20 This holding was based on the statute and, unfortunately,
failed to address the trial court's disavowal of authority on consti-
tutional grounds. 121
While a number of courts have recognized the issue whether the
unconditional release of the insanity acquittee is constitutionally
compelled, they have declined to rule on the question.2 2 A number
of courts have held that the power to conditionally release eligible
insanity acquittees while reserving jurisdiction to release them ab-
solutely or to recommit them, is inherent in the court's continuing
jurisdiction over insanity acquittees.11
2. The Release of an Insanity Acquittee May Be Conditioned on
Therapeutic Grounds
Other courts have recognized that it is proper to place conditions
of a therapeutic nature on the release from confinement of a per-
117. 44 Ohio App. 2d at -, 73 Ohio Ops. 2d at , 337 N.E.2d at 802. Holderbaum is
particularly relevant because of one of the conditions of release was that the patient seek
employment. The remaining conditions were all of a therapeutic or reporting nature.
118. 42 Ohio St. 2d 372, -, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 333, -. , 328 N.E.2d 814, 815.
119. 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1975).
120. 306 So. 2d at 120.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Zion v. Xanthopoulos, 178 Mont. 468, 585 P.2d 1084 (1978); Warner v.
State, 244 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1976); Powell v. Genung, 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1975).
123. United States v. McNeil, 434 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1978); Rawland v. Sheppard, 304 Minn. 496, 232 N.W.2d 8 (1975); State
v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974).
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son who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity.12 4 There
is substantial support for the theory that it is improper to condi-
tion the release of a NGRI inmate by imposing restrictions which
are similar to those which are imposed on convicted criminals who
are released on probation or parole. 125 This result is based on the
premise that a NGRI acquittee is not a convicted criminal and is
not properly subject to restrictions that are appropriately placed
on convicts.
121
These principles were articulated in Scheidt v. Meredith.1 2 7
Scheidt involved a habeas corpus petition of an inmate of a state
hospital who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity. The
court held that "the imposition of [conditions imposed upon a con-
victed criminal who had been placed on probation] on one who has
not been convicted of a crime is unconstitutional and that peti-
tioner could not be denied his release based on the refusal to ac-
cept these conditions. 12 8 Petitioner "was not legally responsible
for the acts committed. He was not therefore a convicted
criminal.112 9
The court began from the following premise:
The state may not constitutionally impose criminal sanctions
against persons who have committed no crime. The purpose of mod-
ern criminal probation is said to be rehabilitative and educational,
yet such a program is designed for the guilty and not for those who
are not guilty. An essential requirement [for the imposition of reha-
bilitative conditions on release] is an adjudication of guilt.... Al-
though probation may not be primarily punitive in nature, punitive
aspects are clearly involved. Since a person may not, consistent with
the Constitution, be punished when he has committed no crime, it
would be unconstitutional to impose criminal probation conditions
on someone in petitioner's circumstances. Just as release on proba-
tion may not be weighted with terms and conditions which have
nothing to do with the purpose or policy of probation, conditional
release of a man who has been restored to sanity may not be condi-
tioned on terms having no relation to his status.
The interests of the community and the individual are relevant to
1
124. 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 90 (1981). Contra, Holderbaum v. Watkins, 44 Ohio
App. 2d 253, 73 Ohio Ops. 2d 256, 337 N.E.2d 800 (1974).
125. See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 933 (1980).
126. Id.
127. 307 F. Supp. 63 (D. Colo. 1970).




the granting of a conditional release. Thus, it would be clearly
proper to require that petitioner accept psychiatric out-patient care
or supervision. However, terms which were designed to regulate the
activities of convicted criminals, and which are punitive in nature,
cannot be imposed in a case such as this. 30
Following the principles articulated in Scheidt and Holderbaum,
the Supreme Court of Montana, in Zion v. Xanthopoulos,13 1 deter-
mined that conditioning the release of a NGRI patient upon com-
pliance with parole rules and regulations was a constitutionally im-
permissible infringement on the liberty of a patient who had not
been convicted of a crime and who was not now a danger to herself
or others.132 The trial court in Zion had conditioned the patient's
release on a willingness to accept supervision by the Parole Divi-
sion of the Montana Department of Institutions.35 The Montana
Supreme Court first noted that petitioner was not legally responsi-
ble for the act committed and that she was not regarded as a con-
victed criminal.1 34 The court reasoned that "imposition of a condi-
tion designed for punishment or retribution is inapposite in
dealing with an individual who has been acquitted of the crime
charged.13 5 Noting that petitioner "who has not been convicted of
a crime and who was not sentenced to the state prison does not fall
within either class of person to whom the criminal probation or
parole provisions apply," the court found it clear that "such a per-
son may not be constitutionally subject to such conditions. .... $,.36
The Supreme Court of Montana noted, however, that it was "re-
luctant to declare flatly for all purposes that some form of oversee-
ing by the Parole Division would be unacceptable as a condition of
release of an insanity acquittee. '13 7
In accordance with the basic principles articulated in these
cases, a number of courts have determined that conditions which
130. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that in the course
of this discussion the court specifically identified rehabilitative and educational conditions
as punitive.
131. 178 Mont. 468, 585 P.2d 1084 (1978).
132. Id.
133. Id. at -, 585 P.2d at 1086.
134. Id. at -, 585 P.2d at 1087.
135. Id. (citation omitted).
136. Id. See Scheidt v. Meredith, 307 F. Supp. 63 (D. Colo. 1970); Holderbaum v. Wat-
kins, 44 Ohio App. 2d 253, 73 Ohio Ops. 2d 256, 337 N.E.2d 800 (1974). The Zion court
specifically declined to discuss the constitutionality of the statute which had allowed such
conditions to be imposed.
137. 178 Mont. at _ 585 P.2d at 1089.
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relate solely to the therapeutic monitoring and control of insanity
acquittees are appropriate conditions of release.138 Not all penal
release conditions, however, have been stricken down by the
courts. In Campbell v. District Court of Eighteenth Judicial Dis-
trict for County of Arapahoe,"5 9 the Supreme Court of Colorado
found a patient to be in violation of a release condition which re-
quired that he not possess firearms. The court noted that the pro-
scription against penal conditions articulated in Scheidt was di-
rected not to all punitive conditions, but only to "[t]he imposition
of criminal probationary conditions which were not related to the
individual seeking release. 1 40 The court found that "[tihe only
condition imposed upon the petitioner's release which is commonly
imposed upon criminal probations is the prohibition relating to the
possession of firearms, a condition directly related to the abnormal
and highly dangerous behavior which resulted in the petitioner's
initial commitment. 14 1 The court then concluded that "[a] release
condition of [a penal] nature is not unconstitutional if it bears a
relationship to the particular individual seeking release and is in
the best interests of the defendant and the community.
1 42
The holding which emerges from this line of cases is that only
those non-therapeutic conditions which bear a relationship to the
particular individual seeking release may be imposed upon the re-
lease of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity." 3
Thus, to be valid, conditions must be individualized rather than
boiler plate.
This principle gives rise to an interesting problem, however. The
court in Scheidt determined that rehabilitative and educational
conditions were constitutionally inappropriate as conditions of re-
lease. 1 44 In contrast, the court in Zion specifically held that voca-
138. See People v. Blumenshine, 72 ]M. App. 3d 949, 29 IlM. Dec. 73, 391 N.E.2d 232 (1979)
(outpatient care, reside with mother, participate in alcohol counseling program); Hill v.
State, 358 So. 2d 190 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1978) (continue medication and periodic psychiat-
ric review); Warner v. State, 309 Minn. 333, 244 N.W.2d 640 (1976) (structured living condi-
tions, outpatient psychiatric care, supervision by social worker); Rawland v. Sheppard, 304
Minn. 496, 232 N.W.2d 8 (1975) (continue medication, periodic examination and psychiatric
review, periodic report by county welfare department).
139. 195 Colo. 304, 577 P.2d 1096 (1978).
140. Id. at -, 577 P.2d at 1098.
141. Id. at . 577 P.2d at 1098.
142. Id. at , 577 P.2d at 1099.
143. Id. at -, 577 P.2d at 1099. See Zion v. Xanthopoulos, 178 Mont. 468, 585 P.2d 1084
(1978).
144. 307 F. Supp. at 66.
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tional training conditions were constitutionally permissible.'45 This
conflict leaves undetermined the basic nature of vocational train-
ing requirements. Are such requirements punitive in nature and
therefore constitutionally infirm in the absence of some relation to
the patient or, rather, are they therapeutic in nature and constitu-
tionally permissible?
A number of factors support the argument that vocational train-
ing requirements are punitive. Vocational training is inherently re-
habilitative in nature-rehabilitation being one of the four classi-
cal justifications of punishment.14 Vocational training is typically
mandated for prisoners.1 47 There is also strong support for the pro-
position that vocational rehabilitation techniques are wholly inef-
fective. 148 If true, this substantially detracts from their therapeutic
value.
It seems more plausible to argue, however, that vocational train-
ing, while not a "treatment" for mental illness, is nonetheless ther-
apeutic as opposed to punitive in nature.149 While rehabilitation is
often employed in punitive contexts, it is also offered to many non-
prison populations without punitive intent. This form of therapy is
not strictly treatment for an illness, but it has as its goal the allied
therapeutic purposes of restoring lost functioning, maintaining a
stable condition, or imparting new skills in the wake of the illness
after the illness has responded to treatment.150
In this context, vocational training is more akin to such prophy-
lactic measures as drug maintenance therapy to prevent relapse
than to treatment for the primary condition for which the patient
was hospitalized initially. Alternatively, it may be viewed as analo-
gous to the use of speech therapy in restoring communicative skills
to laryngectomy patients. While no one would question the impor-
tance of teaching esophageal speech to such individuals, neither
145. 178 Mont. at -, 585 P.2d at 1090.
146. Selva, Treatment as Punishment, 6 NEw ENG. J. PRISON L. 265 (1980).
147. Lopez, supra note 63, at 566. See Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
148. See Fishman, An Evaluation of Criminal Recidivism in Projects Providing Rehabili-
tation and Diversion Services in New York City, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283 (1977).
Personal communications with a number of patients at Western State Hospital, Staunton,
Virginia also support the ineffectiveness of vocational training programs. These programs
are viewed as just one more hoop to jump through before the patient can get "back on the
street."
149. See text accompanying notes 21-36 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
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would anyone regard speech therapy as treatment for laryngeal
cancer.
The purpose of this form of therapy is restoration. The Virginia
Code explicitly provides for this type of therapy under the condi-
tional release procedure." 1 Presumably, if the patient is in need of
vocational training, that individual has progressed to the point
where he is not in need of continuous involuntary hospitaliza-
tion. 152 Indeed if he had not progressed at least that far, it is
doubtful if vocational training could be of any substantial benefit
to the patient.153
Section 37.1-67.3 of the Virginia Code provides that a patient
who still meets the criteria for involuntary commitment but who is
not in need of involuntary hospitalization "shall be subject to
court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital,
night treatment in a hospital, referral to a community mental
health clinic, or other such appropriate treatment modalities as
may be necessary to meet the needs of the individual. 1 54
Thus, as a matter of substantive due process, vocational training
may be imposed as a valid condition of release if certain facts are
presented. First, vocational training generally is not considered
treatment 55 and therefore may be imposed only if necessary to
prevent relapse or to restore essential lost functioning. Once these
purposes are no longer served, requiring vocational training or any
other condition of release is unconstitutional.58 Vocational train-
ing must therefore be tied to some valid therapeutic goal of the
patient care program.
Second, vocational training may be imposed pursuant to a condi-
tional release procedure. The factors discussed above require, how-
ever, that the lack of vocational training be related to the thera-
peutic needs of the patient. The same conclusion has also been
reached with respect to vocational training as a pre-condition of
release.157 As will be developed below, no less is required by the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
151. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981), VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181 (3) (Cum.
Supp. 1981).
152. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
155. See text accompanying notes 21-36 supra.
156. Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 933, 935 (1980).




The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment pro-
vides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law."' 158 Like substantive due process, equal protection anal-
ysis is divided into two levels of judicial scrutiny.159 Where strict
scrutiny due process analysis requires that state intrusions into
protected liberty interests be justified by some compelling govern-
mental interest, strict scrutiny equal protection analysis requires
that the state establish a compelling interest in its distinction be-
tween classes which are similarly situated.16 0 Further, the state
must prove that those distinctions are the least restrictive availa-
ble means necessary to fulfill its purpose.61 Similarly, rational ba-
sis due process analysis requires a determination of whether it is
rational to believe that the government policy involved promotes a
legitimate government purpose; a rational basis exists for the dif-
ferential treatment of similarly situated individuals if the purpose
for the differential treatment is legitimate and articulated. 2
The individual possesses a fundamental right to remain free
from confinement. Acquittees by reason of insanity and civil com-
mittees are similarly situated in terms of this right. Distinctions in
treatment between these two categories must, therefore, be based
on a compelling state interest.16 3
Equal protection problems raised by distinctions drawn between
NGRI defendants and civil committees are more serious at the re-
lease stage than at initial confinement. This discussion has focused
solely on the legitimacy of differential treatment at the release
stage. In practice, significant distinctions continue to be made both
at the point of commitment and at the point of release.1'
It is necessary to examine the rationales which have been offered
in support of governmental distinctions between civil committees
158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
159. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 253. But see Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma
County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), where the Court appears to depart from the two pronged,
rational basis, strict scrutiny, analysis.
160. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
161. Id.
162. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977).
163. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 266.
164. Id. Significant distinctions have always been made at the point of initial confine-
ment. There are strong arguments that the NGRI verdict requires equal treatment of crimi-
nal and civil committees at all stages.
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and insanity acquittees: (1) the state has an interest in deterring
false insanity pleas; (2) those acquitted may have a degree of cul-
pability for an offensive act which civil committees do not have;
and (3) the acquitted patient may be more likely to injure others
since his conduct has already manifested itself in an antisocial
manner.
165
While the first rational presents a legitimate state interest, it is
questionable whether it should justify continued confinement of
those already adjudicated as not guilty by reason of insanity. The
NGRI verdict exonerates the defendant from liability. The defen-
dant has committed a wrongful act yet the wrong is not attributa-
ble to him due to his insanity.6 6 The purpose of the verdict is to
excuse from punishment those individuals who are not culpable for
their actions.167
In United States v. Brown,'68 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that, for purposes of initial commitment,
the deterrence of false guilty pleas is a legitimate interest which
can be protected by differential treatment of the NGRI defendant.
At least three jurisdictions, however, disagree with the Brown
holding.' 6 Additionally, the Brown court conceded that any deter-
ence value wanes after a lengthy confinement. 7 0
The second rationale, that the NGRI acquittee may possess
some meaningful degree of culpability, is misguided. This argu-
ment entirely overlooks the underlying purpose of the not guilty by
reason of insanity verdict.'7 ' Since the individual is insane, in our
jurispurdence that person while capable of acting cannot supply
the second requisite of mens rea necessary to convict him-a cul-
pable mind. The culpability rationale also falls to take into consid-
eration the level of culpability of the civil committee, since the
only valid distinction which can be drawn between the two is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of commission of a criminal act.17 1 Cul-
pability, however, comprises many factors which the NGRI verdict
simply fails to consider. 173
165. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 270-77.
166. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
167. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968).
168. 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
169. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 272 n.343.
170. 478 F.2d at 612.
171. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 272, see notes 108 & 109 supra.
172. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 272.
173. Many civil committees are NGRI simply because of the exercies of prosecutorial dis-
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The third rationale of manifest dangerousness is similarly defec-
tive. Past dangerous acts by the NGRI are not more probative of
future danger than the past dangerous acts of the civil committee.
If the best evidence of a person's prospective dangerousness is his
past dangerousness, how is the NGRI defendant ever to be re-
leased? Even the most sophisticated clinical predictors of danger-
ousness are subject to unacceptably high rates of error. We cannot
ascribe greater accuracy or precision to the prosecution or acquittal
of a NGRI.'7
Regardless of distinctions which could be drawn at the commit-
ment phase, there is substantial authority that no distinction be-
tween the NGRI and the civil committee should extend beyond the
maximum sentence for the offense. Beginning with Baxtrom v. He-
rold,17 5 a line of cases has found that NGRI-civil committee dis-
tinctions become so attenuated by the end of the penal term or
maximum sentence as to be non-viable. Baxtrom held that the pro-
tection afforded a civil committee must be extended to a state pris-
oner at the end of his sentence in order for the state to retain cus-
tody of the prisoner."'
Based on this holding, in United States v. Brown,17 7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that:
[w]hen the [insanity acquittee] has been in detention for a consider-
able period of time, his continued detention vel non should be gov-
erned by the same standard of burden of proof as applies to civil
commitments. The extent of that period calls for sound discretion,
would take into account, e.g., the nature of the crime (violent or
not), nature of treatment given and response of the person, would
generally not exceed five years, and should, of course, never exceed
the maximum sentence for the offense, less mandatory release
time.178
cretion. The civil committee may be just as culpable as the NGRI but was never charged
with a felony because of the response of his victim. Another distinction could be generated
by the fact that the NGRI was competent to stand trial and the civil committee was not.
Indeed, the civil committee may be a great deal more dangerous or culpable than the NGRI
yet will enjoy a lower standard of proof for release. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 276-77.
174. See MONAHAN, supra note 49; Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 49. See also WEXLER,
CRMINAL Comw suTNTs AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS (1976).
175. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
176. Id.
177. 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
178. Id. at 612.
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Returning to the issue in United States v. Ecker,19 the court held
that "equal protection requires the standards governing the release
of criminal acquittees who have been confined for a period equal to
the maximum sentence authorized for their crimes to be substan-
tially the same as the standards applicable to civil committees."180
In Jones v. United States,"'1 the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed the
rule.18 2
To summarize, distinctions in release procedures between the
NGRI defendant and civil committees raise questions of equal pro-
tection violations.8 s Given that the fundamental interest in liberty
requires strict judicial scrutiny, these differences should be tested
under the compelling interest standard. Under this standard, it is
impossible to justify continuation of the assumption that the not
guilty by reason of insanity defendant is distinguishable from the
civil committee. Even if we are to assume that the state may legiti-
mately distinguish between the NGRI defendant and the civil
committee at the initial commitment stage,8 at release this dis-
tinction is so attentuated as to be constitutionally defective. By the
time these individuals are ready to leave the hospital and all that
is justifying confinement is the patient's lack of vocational train-
ing, there is no viable distinction remaining between the two clas-
ses to justify differential treatment. In light of the constitutional
dictates of equal protection, these classes of individuals must be
afforded the same level of protection under the law. The Constitu-
tion mandates equal treatment by the least restrictive means.
The release of civil committees may be conditioned on the re-
ceipt of vocational training in some circumstances. Vocational
training can be required only if the training bears some relation-
ship to the individual's insanity or dangerousness. Equal protec-
tion requires that it be imposed on NGRI patients only upon a
similar showing.
179. 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977).
180. 543 F.2d at 188 n.34 (citations omitted).
181. 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
182. In Jones, however, the court limited the application of the rule to the applicability of
civil release procedures. The state is not required to release the individual if it does not
choose to initiate civil commitment and procedures. Rather, the individual's release is gov-
erned by the standards of release for civil committees.
183. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 277.
184. An assumption which, arguably, is itself invalid under the strict scrutiny analysis.




Involuntary confinement intrudes upon an individual's natural
legal status of freedom. Infringement of this right to liberty can be
justified only if the committing jurisdiction satisfied strict scrutiny
standards of due process and equal protection. 85 In accordance
with these constitutional mandates, vocational training can be im-
posed upon an insanity acquittee only through the procedure of
conditional release. Due process requires that this determination
be made at a full hearing with findings of fact supporting the con-
clusion that vocational training is necessary to ensure the NGRI's
safety or sanity. Equal protection requires that no more stringent
standards be imposed on the NGRI than are imposed on civil com-
mittees. Therefore, whether viewed either as a condition or precon-
dition of release, vocational training may be imposed only when it
can be shown to bear some relationship to the insanity or danger-
ousness of the patient being considered for release, regardless of
status.
185. Kirschner, supra note 55, at 277.
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APPENDIX
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181 (m. Supp. 1981)-
(1) When the defense is insanity or feeblemindedness of the
defendant at the time the offense was committed, the jury shall be
instructed, if they acquit him on that ground, to state the fact with
their verdict, and the court shall place him in temporary custody
of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation,
hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner, and appoint three
physicians or two physicians and one clinical psychologist, skilled
in the diagnosis of insanity and feeblemindedness, to examine the
defendant and make such investigation as they may deem neces-
sary in order to determine whether, at the time of their examina-
tion, he is insane or feebleminded and to determine whether his
discharge would be dangerous to the public peace and safety or to
himself and to report their findings to the court. Upon receipt of
such report, the court shall forthwith order a hearing. If the court
is satisfied by the report, or such testimony of the examining phy-
sicians or clinical psychologist as it deems necessary, that the de-
fendant is insane or feebleminded or that his discharge would be
dangerous to public peace and safety or to himself, the court shall
order him to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner.
Otherwise, the defendant forthwith shall be discharged and
o released.
(2) If the director of the State hospital in which a person is
confined under paragraph (1) of this section is of the opinion that
a person committed to his custody, pursuant to paragraph (1) of
this section, is not insane or feebleminded and may be discharged
or released without danger to the public peace and safety or to
himself, he shall make application for the discharge or release of
such person in a report to the court by which such person was
committed and shall transmit a copy of such application and re-
port to the attorney for the Commonwealth for the city or county
from which the defendant was committed. Upon receipt of such
application for discharge or release, the court forthwith shall ap-
point at least two qualified psychiatrists, one of whom shall be an
employee of a State mental institution other than the one in which
the person is confined, to examine such person and to report
within sixty days of their opinion as to his mental condition. To
facilitate such examination and the proceedings thereon, the Com-
missioner shall transfer such person to the appropriate State
mental institution located nearest the place where the court sits.
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(3) If the court is satisfied by the application and report seek-
ing the release or discharge of the committed person filed pursuant
to paragraph (2) of this section and by the report or such testi-
mony of the reporting psychiatrists, appointed pursuant to para-
graph (2) of this section, as the court deems necessary, that the
committed person is not insane or feebleminded and that his dis-
charge or release will not be dangerous to the public peace and
safety or to himself, the court shall order his discharge or release.
If the court is not so satisfied, it shall promptly order a hearing to
determine whether the committed person is at the time insane or
feebleminded and to determine whether his discharge would be
dangerous to the public peace and safety or to himself. Any such
hearing shall be deemed a civil proceeding and the burden shall be
on the committed person to prove that he is not insane or feeble-
minded and that his discharge would not be dangerous to the pub-
lic peace and safety or to himself. According to the determination
of the court upon such hearing, the committed person shall there-
upon be discharged or released or shall be recommitted to the cus-
tody of the Commissioner. Upon recommendation of the Commis-
sioner, the court may, in lieu of discharging or releasing, or
recommitting the person to the custody of the Commissioner, per-
mit such person to be treated as a patient committed purusant to
§§ 37.1-67.1 through 37.1-67.4, subject to such limitations and re-
strictions as the court may deem appropraate and such individual
shall remain under the jurisdiction of the committing court subject
to such modification or additional order as the court may deter-
mine appropriate. It shall be the duty of the superintendent of the
institution in which such person is confined, at yearly intervals
commencing six months after the date of confinement, to make a
report of such person's condition to the court from which he was
committed.
(4) At yearly intervals commencing six months after the date of
confinement, and not more frequently, a committed person may
make application to the court by which he was committed for his
discharge or release and shall transmit a copy of such application
and report to the attorney for the Commonwealth for the city or
county from which the defendant was committed and the proce-
dure to be followed upon such application shall be the same as that
prescribed above in the case of an application by the superinten-
dent of the institution in which such person is confined. The attor-
ney for the Commonwealth for the city or county from which the
defendant was committed shall represent the interests of the Coin-
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monwealth in proceedings under subsections (3) and (4) of this
section.
(5) No trial court in this Commonwealth, other than the court
which ordered the comitment of a person committed purrsuant to
paragraph (1) of this section, shall have jurisdiction to entertain
any action seeking the release of such person committed pursuant
to paragraph (1)), whether the release is sought through applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus or otherwise. Errors committed or
allowed by the court having jurisdiction over the release proceed-
ings set forth in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this section shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court as in other civil cases except ap-
peals of right.
(6) Costs of the service of physicians or clinical psychologists
required by this section shall be paid by the State as provided in §
19.2-175.
(7) In applying this section the term "feebleminded" shall be
construed to mean a person who is adjudicated legally incompetent
because of mental deficiency by a circuit court in which he is
charged with crime and who is also found to lack the mental condi-
tion to enable him to be discharged without danger to the public
peace and safety or to himself.
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